Chelsea: Marcos Alonso’s goal shows how “false 3” is better than their “true 9”

David de Gea and Marcos Alonso teamed up to give Chelsea a single point at Old Trafford on Sunday. Alonso’s goal should be enough to send Gonzalo Higuain on his way at the end of the season.

If Marcos Alonso’s critics have their way, Alonso would leave Chelsea as he arrived: as a journeyman left-back. Maurizio Sarri’s set-up does not do any of the defenders any favours, but Alonso’s exposure has been made worse because Sarriball has not given him the freedom to stay high and drift centrally into the box.

Over Alonso’s two years as left wing-back under Antonio Conte, he responded to opponents neutralizing him on the flank by coming inside towards the box. As last season went on, Alonso was increasingly the “false 3,” spending more time near the central part of the forward line than on the outside ready to track back (for better or worse). In addition to his six goals, he had many acrobatic near-misses from parts of the box where you might expect to see the No. 9, especially with Conte using Eden Hazard as the false-nine so frequently.

Alonso’s movement supported his offensive skills and his eye for goal. His attacking contributions and the defensive cover of a three-man back-line compensated for his defensive shortcomings. This season, though, he is defensively vulnerable while unable to balance that with goals and chances.

Against Manchester United, Alonso gave himself a chance and showed why Chelsea’s false-3 is better than their true-9.

David Luiz made a short pass to Antonio Rudiger to set things in motion. Rudiger took the pass about 10 yards ahead of the midfield circle, with a large patch of open space ahead of him. Alonso was on the left side (Chelsea’s left) of the penalty box, about five yards above it. Gonzalo Higuain was dead centre at the top of the box, with N’Golo Kante a few yards over to the right.

As soon as Rudiger took his first step forward with the ball, Alonso started a run into the box. He  turned as though he was expecting a long ball from Rudiger (because this is Sarriball, where long balls are a little-discussed fact of life if Chelsea want to score). Alonso got the jump on Ander Herrera with his acceleration and turn inside, but checked once he saw that Rudiger was continuing to dribble. Alonso may have thought he had to stay onsides, even though Eric Bailly would have played him on, as Bailly was a few yards behind the other defenders.

Higuain did not change his position or body orientation. He was still squarely with his back to goal, ready to receive a pass into his feet and lay it off to a runner.

Just as Rudiger was taking his final step before the shot, Herrera came around Alonso. This was Herrera’s defensive error. He came around Alonso on the ball side, which left no one between Alonso and the Manchester United goal.

Herrera was caught ball-watching. He may have thought he should close down Higuain, the striker being the more likely target of the next pass. But Bailly was closer and had better body position to Higuain, and in any event, Herrera should have known of Rudiger’s ability and Chelsea’s propensity to shell long-balls from the centre-backs into the box.

As soon as the ball left Rudiger’s foot, Alonso was charging into the box. In order, the players responding to the rebound and Alonso’s presence in the box were: Eric Bailly, Ander Herrera (who was closer to Alonso both horizontally and vertically) and Gonzalo Higuain.

Higuain did not transition from walk to jog until Alonso took his stutter step to line up his shooting foot with the ball. The Argentine did not not transition from jog to trot until he looked over to the right touchline, verified the flag was down and then trotted to pick the ball out of the net and celebrate.

Alonso’s shot hit the inside of the far post. A few millimeters to the right or a different direction of spin and the ball would have been loose in the six-yard box. Had that happened, either Bailly or Herrera would have had enough time to dribble the ball out of danger – let alone blast it out of bounds with one touch – before a Chelsea player could have poked it home. Had Higuain started his run towards the net once Rudiger took his shot, he would have been a contender for that rebound. At the very least, he would have forced Bailly or Herrera into a rushed clearance, which likely would have given Chelsea possession through a throw-in or corner kick.

Marcos Alonso did everything the No. 9 should have done, and probably more than a left-back should have.

Had de Gea caught Rudiger’s shot, he could have sent a quick pass up his right side, into the space behind Eden Hazard and Mateo Kovacic where Alonso should be on defence.

N’Golo Kante was close to Higuain throughout this whole process. He played the odds, expecting de Gea to smother the shot. Kante kept himself in the best position to recover his defensive duties, as Alonso “should” have done.

The striker, a position who has no defensive duties to recover to so quickly (if at all), whose only duties in these situations are to poach lose balls, pounce on opportunities and pressure the build-up, was nowhere near the action.

It’s a bit ironic that Gonzalo Higuain was offsides five times in the game, including three times in the middle third of the pitch, but the one time he should have been making a decisive move off the backline in a threatening position he was lazily spectating.

Gonzalo Higuain has done next to nothing to justify* his inclusion in Chelsea’s starting XI this spring, let alone deserve all of next season. If the Blues decide not to bring Tammy Abraham or Michy Batshuayi into the squad next season, they could do worse than thinking about Marcos Alonso as the false-3 / occasional / honorary 9. He’d be better than an on-paper placeholder 9.

*Other than play at Napoli three years ago, of course.