Chelsea traded midfield movements for pure motivation in second half vs. Ajax

Chelsea’s first half against Ajax had some notable movement while pressing, particularly in the midfield. Any attempt to break down the second half into tactics and organization is to court folly.

Down 3-1 at halftime, Chelsea’s midfield movement patterns looked like they would be an interesting but somewhat dry topic to avoid dwelling on a defeat. Like everything else about the first half, that assessment was overtaken by the events of the second.

Mason Mount and Mateo Kovacic were the Blues’ most aggressive and creative pressers. When Ajax cycled the ball through their own half, Mount and Kovacic usually started their pressing runs from near the midfield line. Mount would usually, but not always, make the first run. If Ajax’s reaction to Mount starting his press was to pass the ball back to the centrebacks near the penalty area or to the goalkeeper, Kovacic would move in support of Mount while Tammy Abraham closed down Andre Onana. Chelsea’s wingers, then, would cover either the full-back or a midfielder dropping deep.

Mount and Kovacic were nearly making overlapping runs with each other on the press. Mount and Abraham, would do the same. This wasn’t a simple case of one-up one-back: the Blues’ three best pressers coming straight up the middle set the contours of Ajax’s build-up play. Ajax could either go where Chelsea wanted them to go, or where they – Ajax – didn’t want to go.

The other notable feature of the press was Marcos Alonso coming into the centre of the pitch. With Ajax’s right winger dropping deep to support the build-up, Christian Pulisic had to tend to both the right full-back and the right wing. Alonso took up Kovacic’s normal area, on the same line as Jorginho to cover any long ball or other advance up the centre of the pitch.

This, obviously, left Chelsea exposed down their left side because of Alonso’s inattention and sluggish movements in the first half. Chelsea’s corralling of the play worked to Ajax’s advantage by taking the ball into a weak zone. Had Alonso been in his usual form – proactively moving into the right positions (in part to cover his lack of speed, especially relative to Ajax) and tracking runners more diligently – the set-up would have worked.

The midfield movement is one more sign why the numerical indicators of Chelsea’s formation work on the team sheet graphics and not much more than that. From their base 4-3-3, the Blues were – at any given snapshot in time – in one of a half-dozen other formations (was that a 3-2-5 when pressing with Alonso and Jorginho covering midfield?). Particularly when pressing, Lampard seems to be giving his players the most specific directions within the broadest range of options; while on offence, for example, they have almost run of the house within the structures of his overall philosophy. And in earlier games, most of the creative movement was in build-up play, with different midfielders dropping between the centrebacks to draw out the opponent’s press.

Frank Lampard’s decision to substitute Reece James for Marcos Alonso at halftime enabled much of what Chelsea accomplished in the second half, but it was hardly the deciding factor.

Remember, it was Kurt Zouma’s marauding 60-yard dribble that set the tone for the half. Whether that was by design or Zouma simply saw the opportunity to take the initiative and put the manager’s halftime talk into practice before anyone else could, it exemplified whatever went on in the locker room.

The second half was about motivation and purpose. Much like the game against Newcastle where Chelsea needed a halftime refresher on counter-attacking, and came out a much more aggressive and purposeful team than in the first half, the second half against Ajax was not won on tactics or a substitution. That is true for the 25 minutes before the double red cards as the 20 minutes after.

Chelsea came out for the second half either believing they could get themselves back in the game from 3-1 down, or simply unwilling to crawl meekly through the second half of a European night at home. Zouma’s run ended in Chelsea’s first shot of the half. Within seven minutes they had more shots in the second half than they had in the 45 minutes of the first.

Donny van de Beek’s goal on a 55′ counter-attack quieted Stamford Bridge and temporarily deflated the Blues, but Cesar Azpilicueta’s goal to restore the two-goal deficit also restored the team’s belief that they could overcome the same, or entertain trying. Within five minutes, Ajax had nine men on the pitch as Jorginho stood over his second penalty of the night.

Facing a nine-man team is not something coaches are going to spend much time training for. There are no tactics specific to that situation. With that much of an advantage, coaches have to trust their players to use the two-man advantage to maximize the fundamentals: stretch the field wide, shorten the field vertically, isolate defenders and create overloads. If a team can do that at 11v11, the coach has nothing more to say or do at 11v9.

Chelsea did all of that at 11v9 because they can do it so well at 11v11 and because Frank Lampard had them believing they could at two goals down against a full strength team. Some of the Blues’ execution and decision-making in those late stages could have been better (e.g., Tammy Abraham’s header straight to Onana, Reece James’ floating curling shot in stoppage time), but it only takes one such moment for a win. If not for VAR, Cesar Azpilicueta would have had it; and if not for Onana’s best save of the night, Michy Batshuayi would have had it.

Every great team is equal parts tactical organization and man-management. The two halves showed how much of each Frank Lampard’s Chelsea FC already have. Whether you see the game as a draw that failed to be a win or one that was saved from defeat, in the big picture it was a surreal and entertaining snapshot of this team’s best attributes.