Chelsea: Mason Mount brings the 4-3-3 off the page and into life

Chelsea set up in their usual 4-3-3 against Manchester City. But without Mason Mount, it remained just the way it sounds: three distinct lines of four, three and three players.

Mason Mount started on the bench for the first time in the Premier League. Frank Lampard opted for the experience, defence or some other attribute that he thought the trio of N’Golo Kante, Jorginho and Mateo Kovacic would provide that would overcome what he gave up by leaving Mount out of the XI. For the 73 minutes until Mount came on for Jorginho, Chelsea showed just how much this was a losing exchange.

Last season, Maurizio Sarri’s 4-3-3 went precisely as designed because it is designed to go only one way. How the circuits looked in the textbook is what Chelsea worked on at the training ground and is what they produced in games. Whether those circuits and that style of play created the desired results, well, that’s a matter of interpretation and debate (still, dear God, still).

This season, though, the 4-3-3 is just something that shows up on team sheets and pass maps. Whether and how it works as designed comes down to the individual decisions and executions of the players who don’t know what they are going to do next until they decide to do it. This makes it particularly reliant on the skill sets and tendencies of the individuals on the pitch. Whereas last season Sarri could replace players without too much impact on how things developed since it was the same circuits in the same 4-3-3 (cogs, machines, all that), Frank Lampard cannot swap one player for another without affecting many different aspects of the game and the run of play as a whole.

Without Mount, Chelsea did not have any players to link the midfield and fullbacks with the forwards.

Mount is Chelsea’s best player to operate between the midfield and forward lines. For starters, simply, he actually moves into these areas and, once there, knows where to go. By stepping off the forward line, Mount vacates the space he was in and draws one of the opponent players to do the same, otherwise Mount would be open for a pass.

If one of his teammates passes the ball to him, he is better than anyone else at receiving the ball on the half-turn. This body position allows him to receive the ball knowing where everyone is between him and the goal, both his teammates and opponents. He can then either dribble into an open space himself or play a quick pass to the winger (usually Christian Pulisic) or the striker. Almost as a default setting, he has three accessible options every time the ball comes into his feet.

If he does not receive the ball, he is still moving the opponent’s defenders and midfielders away from the other Chelsea forwards they are marking. This leaves enough space for the Chelsea winger and fullback to move through that space for one to collect the pass and the other to make a third-man run. That can set up an overlap, simple one-two or an “up-back-through.”

Mount’s movement in the latter scenario is a classic “takes two to tango.” If a player comes off the forward line into the space between the lines but no one else moves into the space left behind, then the run is just movement for the sake of it.

This is what happens if Chelsea’s three midfielders are on their line facing forward and Christian Pulisic drops back towards them. He is aping Mount’s movement, but without anyone filling “the Pulisic role” of moving into that now-empty space on the wing, all he does is draw his markers closer to Chelsea’s midfielders.

On the flip side, without someone making that run Pulisic is marked out of being a useful target for a forward pass from the midfielders; and they can stay close to him to prevent him making a run in behind.

Both situations happened regularly against Manchester City. The former, in particular, allowed Manchester City to defend increasingly high until they were setting their defensive line well outside their own box, which facilitated their pressing and counter-attacks.

None of the three midfielders who started for Chelsea on Saturday have Mount’s abilities and acumen in making those runs into the space. Part of this may be due to what they are normally there to do and what Frank Lampard had in mind when he selected them at Mount’s expense.

N’Golo Kante, Jorginho and Mateo Kovacic are used to playing with the play in front of them. Kante and Jorginho are both deep-lying midfielders, whether in a more defensive or playmaking capacity.

This keeps them facing the opponent (in Kante’s case) or the majority of their teammates (Jorginho’s). Rarely will they receive the ball with their backs to the opponent. If they do, Kante is able to dribble out and around into open space before sending the ball forward to a teammate. Jorginho’s tendency when being closed down from behind is to pass the ball back to a centreback or goalkeeper. Neither are used to receiving on the half-turn and either dribbling at the defensive line or sending a quick pass through it, although N’Golo Kante is getting there.

Mateo Kovacic is likewise accustomed and suited to receiving the ball while facing the opponent. If he receives under pressure while facing his goal he can make the quick turns to get into open space facing forward, but will then charge through open space before laying the ball off to a full-back or someone like Mason Mount between the lines.

Without Mount, Chelsea did not have an effective way of connecting their front two lines. They could pass between the two, but the ball rarely found any player in a more advantageous position or body orientation than the player who sent it.

The tactics have to be suited to the unique skills of the players in the XI, and when one planned change to the lineup has this much of an effect it suggests the squad were not ready for such a disturbance.

This is part of the challenge of Frank Lampard’s approach to Chelsea’s training and tactics. There are no ready, pre-formed answers. The players have to solve problems as they arise, including the problem of what to do when someone they rely on so much to fulfill a fundamental tactical task is not in the lineup.

Games like Saturday’s are frustrating, but they are also encouraging because they are the learning curve made manifest. Last season at this time, Chelsea were already on the plateau of peak Sarriball, which was turning into the down slope as every Premier League team recognized how predictable and therefore vulnerable the team were.

If Chelsea are still figuring things out then so are their opponents, which means the Blues will always have the advantage of being a step ahead, even if results sometimes fall short.