Chelsea needed every piece to win: Jorginho on, Emerson off, 4-3-3 back

Frank Lampard made three changes in the 34′ against Arsenal: Emerson came off, Jorginho went on and the Blues shifted to a 4-3-3. Each of those aspects was necessary for Chelsea to fight their way back for a win.

Frank Lampard has a low-key ruthless side, as both of his “natural” left-backs can now attest. Lampard has made two non-injury related substitutions before the start of the second half across Chelsea’s 29 games this season: removing Marcos Alonso at halftime against Ajax and Emerson in the 34′ against Arsenal. Both substitutions worked, but for different reasons; and Emerson’s substitution was the more dramatic because it happened during the course of play and drove a change in Chelsea’s shape and tactics.

Had any one component of this shift not happened – that is, if Lampard had withdrawn a different player, brought on a different player, or made the personnel change without the tactical change and stayed in the 3-4-3 – Chelsea may not have turned the game before halftime nor won late in the second half.

Emerson was having the sort of performance that has had us saying since the low points of 2017/18 that both Chelsea’s left (wing)backs are holding the door open for one another. Either Emerson or Alonso will have a short, decent run, until either performance or regularly-scheduled rotation brings the other into the lineup. Then, in that rare opportunity to make the position his own, the other player seemingly does everything in his power to make fans or the coach regret his decision and look back to the first.

Three coaches have now experienced this dynamic, and Frank Lampard is taking the sternest approach yet, even after Alonso broke the pattern by having an excellent game against Tottenham. Lampard simply minimizes how much either of them play, but he had no other options on Sunday.

In 34 minutes in which Chelsea had 41% possession, a left back needs to have more to show for it than one aerial duel and one tackle. The play regularly passed Emerson by in the middle third, forcing Fikayo Tomori to play like a left-back reinforcing a left winger, which obviously leaves the back line exposed and defeats the purpose of playing a 3-4-3.

Emerson was also at fault for Arsenal’s goal. Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang needed no skill, no guile, nothing in his immense bag of tricks to come around goal side of his nominal marker and score a free header.

The 3-4-3 was not working any better, and probably would not have been improved with a different left wingback. The thought process in using this formation was solid, particularly after it was validated against Tottenham: use the width of the 3-4-3 against the compactness of the opponent’s defence.

Arsenal, surprisingly and to their credit, defended in a compact and disciplined 4-4-2. They were much like the resolute bottom half teams that Chelsea have struggled with in recent weeks, but with high quality players capable of forcing turnovers and quickly launching counterattacks. Whenever Chelsea tried to bring the ball inside, Arsenal had the overload to take possession and attack through the centre, with the wingbacks and midfielders retreating to cover from behind the play.

Arsenal in many ways did what Tottenham should have been able to do. Chelsea were not able to maintain possession in the final third, something that is central to Frank Lampard’s system; and they were constantly in transition, which is when they are most vulnerable on defence in any formation. Frank Lampard’s plan against Mikel Arteta wrote Arteta’s plan against Lampard.

Frank Lampard’s decision reveals his thought process. He needed a formation that could maintain possession in the final third. To do that, he needed players who could maintain possession by quickly moving the ball around, staying one step ahead of Arsenal’s midfielders coming out for an interception or tackle at the top of the final third.

The 3-4-3 had to go because it was needlessly wide and dangerously light in the middle for possession and transition. A 4-2-3-1 would be too much a like-for-like match-up against Arsenal, which would work in their advantage since they were at home, have more quality in their side and had the lead and momentum. The 4-3-3 fit the bill and was another formation Chelsea were familiar with.

Lampard needed an additional midfielder to implement the 4-3-3. Lampard could have stayed with his starting XI. He could have shifted Cesar Azpilicueta into defensive midfield and sent Fikayo Tomori to right back, with Emerson dropping into left back. Azpilicueta is not ideal for maintaining possession under pressure, but he at least would have been able to stanch the counter-attacks coming past N’Golo Kante and Mateo Kovacic.

But that would have been even less of a good idea than making a tactical substitution before halftime.

Someone had to come off, and it had to be a centreback or wing-back. Azpilicueta can play full back on either side, and Fikayo Tomori had played right back in his younger years. Tomori was already covering for Emerson’s underperformance, and Rudiger and Zouma are the most defensively-minded of the three centrebacks. Between Emerson’s performance, Azpilicueta’s and Tomori’s versatility, and Rudiger’s and Zouma’s abilities, Emerson was the obvious choice.

To come on for Emerson, Lampard’s only midfielders on the bench were Jorginho and Ross Barkley. No one ever has tasked Ross Barkley to maintain possession, let alone via quick passing. On the other hand, this is exactly where Jorginho excels. Jorginho ensures the ball does not stay in one place too long, and he can move the ball tightly around the centre and hit the outside as necessary.

Every single aspect of this decision was informed by Chelsea’s performance over the first 30 minutes, and paid off in the subsequent 55 minutes. The 3-4-3 with different players, the same players in the 4-3-3, or other players in the 4-3-3 would not have had the necessary attributes to reverse Arsenal’s momentum for the final 15 minutes (lots of stoppage time) of the first half and give Chelsea a new start for the second.

Chelsea made two more substitutions before they scored their first goal, but it was the initial substitution – a three-for-the-price-of-one change – that put victory back on the table.