Chelsea: Watford-inspired 6-3-1 made defenders out of Pedro and Alonso

Chelsea are normally on the other side of the tactical puzzle, being the team that everyone else gradually figures out until their edge is dull. This time, they learned from Watford how to do the increasingly commonplace task of beating Liverpool.

After several strong games with a three-centreback formation, Chelsea returned to a back four against Liverpool. On paper, this seemed a multiply perilous decision.

First, even with three centrebacks, Chelsea barely have a functioning unit of two. Cesar Azpilicueta was the swing man in the three-man defences, going forward enough to make the set-up a two-centreback formation, but at least on defence he was there alongside the other two. In a four-man defence, Azpilicueta could reverse this process and come from the right back position into a centreback position. But not having five defenders between the centrebacks and the wingbacks seemed to open the door for Liverpool.

Second, Chelsea were returning to a back-four while keeping Marcos Alonso in the lineup. This meant he would be playing left-back. His last game as left-back against top flight opposition was against Ajax on November 5, and halftime of that game started his exile.

Fortunately for Chelsea, Frank Lampard – unlike his direct predecessor – doesn’t train or play by the numbers. The team were nominally in a 4-3-3 with Azpilicueta and Alonso as full-backs, but the Blues did not defend in anything like that, or like anything they had done previously.

Watford not only showed that Liverpool could be beaten, but how to do it. Watford’s tactics were accurately conveyed by The Telegraph’s JJ Bull, who laid out how Chelsea could follow Watford’s example for a similar result.

The Blues did very much that.

As Chelsea settled into their defensive shape, they took on a 4-4-2 with Olivier Giroud and Willian up front. This gave the Blues two outlets for a counterattack in the final moments before Liverpool established themselves fully in offensive possession.

Giroud offered three things: the target, the ability to win the first ball and play it to Willian, and ensuring Virgil van Dijk could not go too far forward to support the offence. Willian was there for his speed on the counter-attack and his ability to maintain possession if the initial charge did not come to anything. Unlike Pedro, if Giroud connected the ball to Willian and Willian was unable to run in for a big chance, Willian could keep possession until his teammates caught up to the attack.

Giroud and Willian were the best pair to attempt a counter-attack and bring the other Blues into the play if the counter wasn’t there.

Once Liverpool set up their offence, Willian and Pedro dropped deep to the outside – very deep and very outside. The two wingers played just outside of their fullbacks so they could mark Liverpool’s fullbacks, who are the main source of Liverpool’s chance creation from the wings.

Willian and Pedro marked Neco Williams and Andy Robertson, respectively. This allowed Chelsea’s fullbacks to focus on Liverpool’s attacking midfielders, Curtis Jones and Adam Lallana. The Blue fullbacks and wingers on each side covered for each other as Liverpool played overlaps to try to set up a cross; and if one of the Liverpool players did not come as far forward, Chelsea could have a 2v1 overload to regain possession.

While the winger-fullback tandem covered the ball, on the ball-far side, the Chelsea full-back could come in to support the centrebacks with the winger covering the far post. This negated Liverpool’s overload in the box: instead of their three forwards against the Blues’ two centrebacks, it was now 3v3.

In front of this backline of six, Chelsea kept a midfield line of three: Billy Gilmour, Mateo Kovacic and Ross Barkley.

This trio, then, gave Chelsea a three-man wall in front of the three defenders (two centrebacks and the ball-far fullback) marking Liverpool’s three forwards. Chelsea shut down the central passing lanes from Virgil van Dijk, Fabinho and, often, Jones. The Blues’ midfield line prevented service into the box up the middle, shutting off the other route towards Sadio Mane and company.

Along with Olivier Giroud hanging up top, the midfielders also prevented van Dijk from doing too much to support the attack or coming close enough to the box to make a crashing run for a header. Kovacic and Barkley are two of Chelsea’s best outlets through the centre, with Kovacic doing more from tight situations he has to dribble and wriggle out of, and Barkley being there to run onto a long ball or in support of Giroud. We quickly learned that Billy Gilmour is just as effective in transition, if not in the counterattack. They all combined to limit how and how many Reds could attack.

This 6-3-1 resulted in some very unusual statistics.

Pedro led the team in both tackles (five) and interceptions (four). Ross Barkley had one tackle and two interceptions. Marcos Alonso had two tackle, two interceptions and four clearances but only two shots. Willian had no defensive actions, despite being the Blues’ best winger when it comes to tracking back and defending.

This was in large part due to Liverpool targeting Chelsea’s left, which they thought would be weaker with Alonso and Pedro.

But the Blues’ system negated any individual weaknesses, as the best systems do.