It’s long been a dream of The Pride of London to see Ross Barkley play as a false nine for Chelsea. Thomas Tuchel finally granted that wish, sort of.
On paper, Chelsea plays one of three formations in almost every match. 3-4-3 is the usual set up, good for most situations and possession. 3-5-2 is more defensive and counter oriented but also very flexible. 3-4-1-2 is somewhere in between, able to control possession while using counters.
The formation Chelsea used against Burnley was somewhere between 3-4-1-2 and 3-4-3, primarily because of Ross Barkley (and later Ruben Loftus-Cheek). Barkley was quite clearly central with Kai Havertz and Callum Hudson-Odoi wider of him. Those two would make runs off of Barkley while he had possession, often cutting in central towards goal. Barkley would also drop quite deep to receive possession in transition.
And that’s where it becomes a blurred line. It’s ultimately academic. Did Barkley start up top and then drop deep like a false nine? Or did he start below the other two and then get forward?
Ultimately, the answer doesn’t really matter as much as how it worked. And it did. While Barkley was on the pitch, the Blues created chance after chance after chance. If he was a false nine, the defenders were unsure as to whether or not they should track him or pass him off to the midfielders. If he was a 10, the midfield was unsure whether it was their job or the defense’s. And that ambiguity allowed Havertz and Hudson-Odoi (as well as Ben Chilwell and Reece James) a lot of space in wider areas to pull Burnley about.
That latter bit of information is why it’s probably safer to view this as a false nine experiment rather than a 10 experiment. Hudson-Odoi and Havertz routinely swapped lanes with James and Chilwell with one always staying wide and the other tucking in. Though that wouldn’t be unheard of for a 3-4-1-2, it would certainly be an unusual way to do things.
This idea is further indicated by Loftus-Cheek’s position when he came on. He stayed much higher up the pitch, not dissimilarly to what Havertz would have done in the same role. Neither dropped nearly as deep or as often as Barkley sought to do.
This also makes a lot of sense. Barkley is big enough to hold players off if need be, but he is also quite clever in his movement throughout the pitch. What often lets him down is his decision making and that was minimized by the spaces that the wingers and wingbacks were able to get into. Those players made for easy decisions for Barkley (who still tried to wind up a shot a few times before thinking better of it).
With Romelu Lukaku and Timo Werner returning after break (in theory), this type of thing won’t happen too much more. But it does show Thomas Tuchel is constantly thinking of new ways to do things and new ways to deploy players. That will keep Chelsea competitive for a while, even if the result against Burnley was ultimately not what the Blues wanted.